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Abstract
One of the major challenges about cyber physical systems is how to prevent cyber attacks to ensure
system integrity. There has been a large number of different types of attacks discussed in the modern
control and computer science communities. In this paper we aim to investigate one special type of attacks
in the discrete-event system framework, where an attacker can arbitrarily alter sensor readings after
intercepting them from a target system in order to trick a given supervisor to issue control commands
improperly, driving the system to an undesirable state. We first consider the cyber attack problem from
an attacker point of view, and formulate an attack with bounded sensor reading alterations (ABSRA)
problem. We then show that the supremal (or least restrictive) ABSRA exists and can be synthesized, as
long as the plant model and the supervisor model are regular, i.e., representable by finite-state automata.
Upon the synthesis of the supremal ABSRA, we present a synthesis algorithm, which ensures that a
computed supervisor will be ABSRA-robust , i.e., either an ABSRA will be detectable or will not lead
the system to an undesirable state.
Index Terms
discrete-event systems, supervisory control, cyber security, attack under bounded sensor reading
alterations, partial observation, controllability
I. INTRODUCTION
A cyber-physical system (CPS) is a mechanism controlled or monitored by computer-based
algorithms. Examples of CPS include smart grid, autonomous automobile systems, medical
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2monitoring, process control systems, distributed robotics, and automatic pilot avionics, etc.
The connection between the cyber part and the physical part heavily relies on communication
networks, which has been raising a major security concern, as different types of cyber attacks
can tamper the data collection processes and interfere safety critical decision making processes,
which may cause irreparable damadges to the physical systems being controlled and to people
who depend on those systems.
There has been a growing number of publications addressing the cyber security issues from
both the computer science community, which focuses on the computer computation related issues,
and the systems control community, which focuses on issues related to the system dynamics
affected by cyber attacks. Recently, more and more efforts have been made in classifying different
types of malicious attacks, assuming that the attackers are sufficiently intelligent [12] [13], instead
of merely just generating random failures, which is well studied in the fields of reliability and
fault tolerant control. Typically, an intelligent attacker requires system knowledge, and abilities
for resource disclosure and resource disruption in order to carry out a successful attack, which is
covert to a system user until the attacker’s goal of causing a damage to the system is achieved.
So covertness and damage infliction are two major characteristics of a successful attack. By
analyzing different intelligent cyber attacks, proper countermeasures may be developed to prevent
a target system from being harmed by a specific type of attacks.
In this paper we study a special type of data deception attacks in the discrete-event system
framework, where an attacker can intercept sensor measurements (or observations) modeled by
observable events and alter them arbitrarily but with an upper bound imposed on the length of
each altered observation sequence. By sending those altered observation sequences to a given
supervisor, whose function is known to the attacker in advance, the attacker can deliberately and
covertly guide the system to move into some undesirable states without making any change to the
supervisor. The key challenge is how to “fool” the supervisor to make it believe that the system
is operating correctly, while using the supervisor’s own control functions to carry out the attack,
i.e., to lead the system move into a bad state. To this end, we first propose the concept of attack
under bounded sensor reading alterations (ABSRA), which can be modelled as a finite-state
transducer, possessing the properties of covertness, damadge infliction and control feasibility
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3under partial observations. Then we show that the supremal (or least restrictive) ABSRA exists
and is computable via a specific synthesis algorithm, as long as both the plant model G and
the given supervisor S are finitely representable. Upon this novel ABSRA synthesis algorithm,
we present a supervisor synthesis algorithm, which can ensure that a nonempty synthesized
supervisor will be “robust” to any ABSRA, in the sense that such an attack will either reveal
itself to the supervisor due to abnormal system executions (so that proper contingent actions can
be taken by the supervisor, which is nevertheless outside the scope of this paper) or will not be
able to lead the system to a bad state (i.e., no damadge will be inflicted).
Our construction of an ABSRA model as a transducer is inspired by some recent work on
opacity enforcement [14], which aims to use observable event insertions to prevent a potential
attacker from correctly determining the actual state of a target system. Due to the different
objectives of two works, the modeling details and synthesis algorithms are completely different.
There have been some works on cyber attack detection and prevention in the discrete-event
community [15] [16] [17], mainly from an adaptive fault tolerant control point of view, which
heavily rely on real-time fault diagnosis to identify the existence of an attack and then take
necessary robust or adaptive supervisory control actions. In those works the intelligence of an
attacker is not considered, and an attack is treated as a fault. As a contrast, we do not rely
on real time attack detection, but rely on prior knowledge of attack models, and simply build
attack-robustness features into a supervisor to ensure that the supervisor will not be affected by
any ABSRA unnoticeably. It is this robust control nature distinguishes our works from existing
DES-based cyber attack detection and prevention approaches, which fall in the adaptive control
domain.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we review the basic concepts
and operations of discrete event systems, and formulate an ABSRA synthesis problem, which is
then solved in Section III, where we show that the supremal ABSRA exists and computable. In
Section IV we present an algorithm to synthesize a supervisor, which is robust to any ABSRA.
A simple yet realistic example runs through the entire paper to illustrate all relevant concepts
and algorithms. Conclusions are drawn in Section V.
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4II. AN ABSRA PROBLEM
In this section we first recall some standard concepts used in the Ramadge-Wonham super-
visory control paradigm. Then we introduce the concept of ABSRA, followed by a concrete
ABSRA synthesis algorithm, which reveals that the supremal ABSRA is computable, as long as
both the plant model and the given supervisor are regular.
A. Preliminaries on supervisory control
Given an arbitrary finite alphabet Σ, let Σ∗ be the free monoid with the empty string  being
the unit element and the string concatenation being the monoid operation. Given two strings
s, t ∈ Σ∗, s is called a prefix substring of t, written as s ≤ t, if there exists u ∈ Σ∗ such that
su = t, where su denotes the concatenation of s and u. Any subset L ⊆ Σ∗ is called a language.
The prefix closure of L is defined as L = {s ∈ Σ∗|(∃t ∈ L) s ≤ t} ⊆ Σ∗. Given two languages
L,L′ ⊆ Σ∗, let LL′ := {ss′ ∈ Σ∗|s ∈ L ∧ s′ ∈ L′} denote the concatenation of two sets. Let
Σ′ ⊆ Σ. A mapping P : Σ∗ → Σ′∗ is called the natural projection with respect to (Σ,Σ′), if
1) P () = ,
2) (∀σ ∈ Σ)P (σ) :=
 σ if σ ∈ Σ′, otherwise,
3) (∀sσ ∈ Σ∗)P (sσ) = P (s)P (σ).
Given a language L ⊆ Σ∗, P (L) := {P (s) ∈ Σ′∗|s ∈ L}. The inverse image mapping of P is
P−1 : 2Σ
′∗ → 2Σ∗ : L 7→ P−1(L) := {s ∈ Σ∗|P (s) ∈ L}.
Given L1 ⊆ Σ∗1 and L2 ⊆ Σ∗2, the synchronous product of L1 and L2 is defined as L1||L2 :=
P−11 (L1) ∩ P−12 (L2), where P1 : (Σ1 ∪ Σ2)∗ → Σ∗1 and P2 : (Σ1 ∪ Σ2)∗ → Σ∗2 are natural
projections. Clearly, || is commutative and associative.
A given target plant is modelled as a deterministic finite-state automaton, G = (X,Σ, ξ, x0, Xm),
where X stands for the state set, Σ for the alphabet, ξ : X ×Σ→ X for the (partial) transition
function, x0 for the initial state and Xm ⊆ X for the marker state set. We follow the notation
system in [10], and use ξ(x, σ)! to denote that the transition ξ(x, σ) is defined. For each state
x ∈ X , let EnG(x) := {σ ∈ Σ|ξ(x, σ)!} be the set of events enabled at x in G. The domain of
ξ can be extended to X × Σ∗, where ξ(x, ) = x for all x ∈ X , and ξ(x, sσ) := ξ(ξ(x, s), σ).
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5The closed behavior of G is defined as L(G) := {s ∈ Σ∗|ξ(x0, s)!}, and the marked behavior
of G is Lm(G) := {s ∈ L(G)|ξ(x0, s) ∈ Xm}. G is nonblocking if Lm(G) = L(G). We assume
that the marker state set Xm is partitioned into two disjoint sets Xm = Xd,m∪˙Xb,m, where Xd,m
is the set of desirable states and Xb,m denotes the set of bad states.
We now recall the concept of supervisors. Let Σ = Σc∪˙Σuc = Σo∪˙Σuo, where disjoint Σc
(Σo) and Σuc (Σuo) denote respectively the sets of controllable (observable) and uncontrollable
(unobservable) events, respectively. Let Γ := {γ ⊆ Σ|Σuc ⊆ γ} be the collection of all control
patterns. A (feasible) supervisory control map of G under partial observation Po : Σ∗ → Σ∗o is
defined as V : L(G)→ Γ, where
(∀s, s′ ∈ L(G))Po(s) = Po(s′)⇒ V (s) = V (s′).
For each s ∈ L(G), V (s) is interpreted as the set of events allowed to be fired after s. Thus,
a supervisory control map will not disable any uncontrollable events, and will impose the same
control pattern after strings, which cannot be distinguished based on observations. Let V/G
denote the closed-loop system of G under supervision of V , i.e.,
•  ∈ L(V/G),
• L(V/G) := {sσ ∈ L(G)|s ∈ L(V/G) ∧ σ ∈ V (s)},
• Lm(V/G) := Lm(G) ∩ L(V/G).
The control map V is finitely representable if V/G can be denoted by a finite-state automaton,
say S = (Z,Σ, δ, zo, Zm = Z) such that
• L(S||G) = L(V/G) and Lm(S||G) = Lm(V/G), where ‘||’ is automaton product [10],
• (∀s ∈ L(S))ES(s) := {σ ∈ Σ|sσ ∈ L(S)} = V (s),
• (∀s, s′ ∈ L(S))Po(s) = Po(s′)⇒ ES(s) = ES(s′).
It has been shown that, as long as a closed-loop language K ⊆ Lm(G) is controllable [4] and
observable [2], there always exists a finitely-representable supervisory control map V such that
Lm(V/G) = K and L(V/G) = K. From now on we assume that V/G is finitely representable
by S, which is called a supervisor. We assume that S is legal in the sense that Lm(S)∩Lm(G) ⊆
{s ∈ Lm(G)|ξ(x0, s) ∈ Xd,m}, i.e., under the supervision of S, the plant G should never enter
any bad marker state.
September 13, 2018 DRAFT
6B. A sensor attack model
We assume that an attacker can intersept each observable event generated by the plant G, and
replace it by a sequence of observable events from Σo in order to “fool” the given supervisor
S, whose function is known to the attacker. Considering that in practice any event occurance
takes an unnegligible amount of time, it is impossible for an attacker to insert an arbitrarily
long observable sequence to replace a received observable event. For this reason, we assume
that there exists a known natural number n ∈ N such that the length of any observable sequence
that the attacker can insert is no more than n. Let ∆n := {s ∈ Σ∗o||s| ≤ n} be the set of
all such bounded observable sequences, where |s| denotes the length of s, and by convention,
|| = 0. We model a sensor attack as a finite state transducer A = (Y,Σ,∆n, η, θ, y0, Ym),
where Y is the state set, Σ the input alphabet, ∆n the output alphabets, y0 the initial state,
Ym the marker state set, which is specifically set as Ym = Y , and η : Y × Σ × ∆n → Y the
(partial) transition map, where for all σ ∈ Σuo and y ∈ Y , η(y, σ, ) = y, i.e., at each state y all
unobservable events are self-looped with  as the output. This is natural because an attacker can
only observe observable events, thus, will not make any move upon unobservable events. We
still keep unobservable events here to make it easy for us for subsequent technical development.
Clearly, L(A) = Lm(A) ⊆ (Σ×∆n)∗. Let ψ : (Σ×∆n)∗ → Σ∗ and θ : (Σ×∆n)∗ → ∆∗n be the
input and output maps, respectively, where for each µ = (σ1, u1)(σ2, u2) · · · (σl, ul) ∈ (Σ×∆n)∗,
ψ(µ) = σ1σ2 · · ·σl and θ(s) = u1u2 · · ·ul.
The basic procedure of an attack is to intercept every single observable event σ ∈ Σo generated
by the plant G, replace it with some observable string u ∈ ∆n, and send u to the supervisor
S, in order to trick S to issue a control command γ ∈ Γ that may drive the plant G towards
a bad marker state. This attack procedure is depicted in Figure 1. The sequential composition
of the attack A and the supervisor S essentially forms a new supervisor, denoted as A ◦ S,
which receives an observable output σ ∈ Σo and generates a control command γ ∈ Γ. The exact
definition of this new supervisor reveals the nature of the attack, which is given below. The
sequential composition of A and S is a deterministic finite state transducer A ◦ S = (Y × Z ∪
{d},Σ ×∆n, ζ, (y0, z0), Ym × Zm), where d denotes the deadlocking dump state, and for each
(y, z), (y′, z′) ∈ Y × Z, (σ, u) ∈ Σ×∆n, ζ(y, z, σ, u) = (y′, z′) if one of the following holds,
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7Fig. 1. The block diagram of an attack plan
• σ ∈ Σuo ∧ u =  ∧ η(y, σ, ) = y′ ∧ δ(z, σ) = z′,
• σ ∈ Σo ∧ η(y, σ, u) = y′ ∧ δ(z, u) = z′.
For each (y, z) ∈ Y ×Z, (σ, u) ∈ Σ×∆n, ζ(y, z, σ, u) = d if η(y, σ, u)! but δ(z, u) is undefined.
Thus, all transitions that go to the dumpt state d may potentially reveal the attack, which, for
an intelligent attack, should be avoided.
The impact of A on the closed-loop system (G,S) is captured by the composition of the plant
G and the new supervisor A ◦ S, i.e.,
G× (A ◦ S) = (X × (Y × Z ∪ {d}),Σ×∆n, κ = ξ × ζ, (x0, y0, z0), Xm × Y × Z),
where for each (x,w), (x′, w′) ∈ X× (Y ×Z ∪{d}), (σ, u) ∈ Σ×∆n, (x′, w′) ∈ κ(x,w, σ, u) if
x′ = ξ(x, σ) and w′ = ζ(w, σ, u). Clearly, G× (A ◦S) is also a transducer, and it is not difficult
to check that
G× (A ◦ S) = G× (Prefix(G× (A ◦ S)) ◦ S),
where “=” is in the sense of DES-isomorphism, and Prefix(·) denotes a function mapping one
transducer to another transducer by simply marking every state. In other words, if A is an attack
model for the system (G,S), then Aˆ := Prefix(G× (A ◦ S)) is also an attack model, which has
the same attack effect as that of A on (G,S). Since ψ(L(Aˆ)) ⊆ L(G), we call Aˆ a canonical
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8attack with respect to (G,S). Since for any attack, there exists a canonical attack, which has the
same attack effect, from now on we only focus on canonical attacks. On the other hand, we will
see that A usually is stucturally simpler than its canonical one Aˆ, whereas the latter is easier to
compute. An interesting question is how to synthesize a simplified attack model A from a given
canonical attack model Aˆ, which bears some similarity to the problem of supervisor reduction
[8], and will be addressed in our future works.
To illustrate the aforementioned concepts, let us go through a simple single-tank example
depicted in Figure 2, which consists of one water supply source whose supply rate is qi, one
Fig. 2. A single tank system
tank, and one control valve at the bottom of the tank controlling the outgoing flow rate qo,
whose value depends on the valve opening and the water level h. We assume that the valve can
only be fully open or fully closed to simplify our illustration, and in case of a full opening, the
water level h can only go down. The water level h can be measured, whose value can trigger
some predefined events, denoting the water levels: low (h=L), medium (h=M), high (h=H), and
extremely high (h=EH). We construct a simple discrete-event model of the system depicted in
Figure 3, where the alphabet Σ contains all events shown in the figure. All events are observable,
i.e., Σo = Σ. Only the actions of opening the valve (qo = 1) and closing the valve (qo = 0)
are controllable, and all water level events are uncontrollable. In the model we use a shaded
oval to denote a marker state, i.e., state 5 and state 9 in Figure 3. Assume that we do not want
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9Fig. 3. Automaton model of the plant G
the water level to be extremely high, i.e., the event h=EH should not occur. Thus, state 9 is
a bad marker state, i.e., Xd,m = {5} and Xb,m = {9}. To prevent state 9 from being reached,
we compose a requirement E shown in Figure 4, whose alphabet is {h=L, h=M, h=H, h=EH},
but the event h=EH is never allowed in the model. A supervisor S can be synthesized by using
the standard Ramadge-Wonham supervisory control paradigm, which is also depicted in Figure
4. It is clear that the supervisor S only opens the valve when the water level is high, i.e., it
Fig. 4. Automaton models of a requirement E (Left) and the supervisor S (Right)
disables the event qo = 0 at state 6 when the event h=H occurs. Our intuition tells us that
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if an attack always change events of h=M, h=H, h=EH to the event h=L, then the supervisor
will not prevent the water level from reaching the extreme high level, i.e., the event h=EH
will happen. For this reason, we conjecture an attack model A shown in Figure 5, where water
levels will be altered to h=L, whereas all other events will remain unchanged. The sequential
Fig. 5. Automaton models of an attack A (Left) and the sequential composition A ◦ S (Right)
composition A ◦ S indicates that, no matter which water level is reached, the attack A always
sends h=L to the supervisor S, which tricks it to believe that it is safe to allow the valve to be
either closed or opened. The impact of A on the closed-loop system (G,S) is depicted in Figure
6. By marking every state in G×(A◦S) we obtain a canonical attack model Prefix(G×(A◦S)).
Proposition 1: (1) θ(Lm(A◦S)) ⊆ Lm(S); (2) Lm(A◦S) ⊆ Lm(A); (3) ψ(Lm(G×(A◦S))) =
ψ(Lm(A ◦ S)) ∩ Lm(G), ψ(L(G× (A ◦ S))) = ψ(L(A ◦ S)) ∩ L(G). 
Proof: By the above definition of sequential composition, the proposition follows. 
Proposition 2: Given two attacks A1 and A2 with the same input alphabet Σ and output
alphabet ∆n, assume that L(A1) ⊆ L(A2). Then we have L(A1 ◦ S) ⊆ L(A2 ◦ S). 
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Fig. 6. Automaton models of G× (A ◦ S)
Proof: By the above definition of sequential composition, the proposition follows. 
Given two attacks A1 and A2 with the same input alphabet Σ and output alphabet ∆n, let
A1 ∪ A2 be their union, which is a deterministic finite-state transducers. Then by the definition
of transducer union, we have L(A1 ∪ A2) = L(A1) ∪ L(A2).
Proposition 3: L((A1 ∪ A2) ◦ S) = L(A1 ◦ S) ∪ L(A2 ◦ S). 
Proof: Since L(A1) ⊆ L(A1 ∪A2) and L(A2) ⊆ L(A1 ∪A2), by Prop. 2 we have L((A1 ∪A2) ◦
S) ⊇ L(A1◦S)∪L(A2◦S). To show the other direction, for each string µ = (σ1, u1) · · · (σn, un) ∈
L((A1∪A2)◦S), by the definition of the sequential composition, we know that µ ∈ L(A1∪A2).
Thus, either µ ∈ L(A1) or µ ∈ L(A2), which means either µ ∈ L(A1 ◦ S) or µ ∈ L(A2 ◦ S).
Thus, µ ∈ L(A1 ◦ S) ∪ L(A2 ◦ S), which concludes the proof. 
So far we have introduced a simple sensor attack model, and explained how this attack affects
the closed-loop system. But we have not described what kind of sensor attacks can be considered
intelligent. Next, we will introduce the concept of ABSRA.
C. An ABSRA model
Let Po : Σ∗ → Σ∗o be the natural projection. An intelligent canonical attack needs to possess
the following properties:
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1) Its insertions must be covert to the given supervisor, i.e.,
θ(L(A)) ⊆ L(S), (1)
namely the supervisor will not see any unexpected observable sequences from the attack.
2) Any of its insertion sequence may potentally cause damages to G, i.e.,
ψ(L(G× (A ◦ S))) = ψ(L(A ◦ S)) ∩ {s ∈ Lm(G)|ξ(x0, s) ∈ Xb,m}, (2)
namely any sequence of insertions by the attack will cause G to reach some bad state
eventually. A weaker version of this property is described below:
ψ(L(G× (A ◦ S))) ∩ {s ∈ Lm(G)|ξ(x0, s) ∈ Xb,m} 6= ∅,
which says that the attack A will tamper the absolute correctness of the supervisor S so
that there exists some possibility that the system may reach some bad marker state.
3) A ◦ S forms a standard supervisor for the plant G that enforces normality [2], i.e.,
P−1o (Po(ψ(L(G× (A ◦ S))))) ∩ L(G) = ψ(L(G× (A ◦ S))), (3)
and
(∀µ ∈ L(G× (A ◦ S)))ψ(EnG×(A0◦S)(κ(x0, y0, z0, µ))) = EnS(δ(z0, θ(µ)), (4)
which denotes that at each state the attack will not intervene the event enablement by the
supervisor because we consider only sensor attacks, not actuator attacks.
We call a nonempty model A satisfying the aforementioned four properties (1)-(4) an Attack
with Bounded Sensor Reading Alterations (ABSRA) of (G,S).
It is not difficult to check that the attack A shown in Figure 5 does not satisfy Property (1)
because S cannot fire qo = 0 before h=L, but A can. Nevertheless, the sequential composition
A ◦ S satisfies all three properties, thus, is an ABSRA. By the aforementioned discussions, we
know that the canonical attack model Prefix(G× (A ◦ S)) is also an ABSRA.
Theorem 1: Given a plant G and a legal supervisor S, let {Ai|i ∈ I} be a (possibly infinite)
collection of ABSRA’s with respect to (G,S). Then ∪i∈IAi satisfies properties (1)-(4). 
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Proof: By Prop. 3, we know that L((∪i∈IAi) ◦ S) = ∪i∈IL(Ai ◦ S). We now verify that ∪i∈IAi
satisfies all four properties.
(a) Since for each i ∈ I , Ai is an ABSRA, we have that
θ(L(Ai)) ⊆ L(S).
Thus, by Prop. 3 we have that
θ(L(∪i∈IAi)) ⊆ L(S).
(b) In addition, we have that for each i ∈ I ,
ψ(L(G× (Ai ◦ S))) = ψ(L(Ai ◦ S)) ∩ {s ∈ Lm(G)|ξ(x0, s) ∈ Xb,m}.
Thus, by Prop. 3 we have
ψ(L(G× ((∪i∈IAi) ◦ S))) = ψ(L((∪i∈IAi) ◦ S)) ∩ {s ∈ Lm(G)|ξ(x0, s) ∈ Xb,m}.
(c) Since for each i ∈ I , we have
P−1o (Po(ψ(L(G× (Ai ◦ S))))) ∩ L(G) = ψ(L(G× (Ai ◦ S))),
we get
P−1o (Po(ψ(L(G× ((∪i∈IA) ◦ S))))) ∩ L(G) = ψ(L(G× ((∪i∈IAi) ◦ S))).
The last property (4) can be easily checked. Thus, ∪i∈IAi satisfies all four properties, and the
theorem follows. 
Theorem 1 only implies that the least restrictive (or supremal) attack language exists. But it
is not clear whether this supremal language is regular, i.e., whether it can be recognized by a
finite-state transducer. Therefore, at this moment the existance of the supremal ABSRA is still
unknown. We now state our main problem in this paper.
Problem 1: Given a plant G and a legal supervisor S, design an ABSRA A. 
In the next section we will show that the supremal attack language is regular, i.e., indeed the
supremal ABSRA exists, and is computable.
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III. SYNTHESIS OF AN ABSRA
We first recall the concepts of controllability [4], and normality [2]. Because we deal with
both finite-state automata and finite-state transducers, to make notations simple, we introduce a
general purpose alphabet Λ, which can be either Λ = Σ or Λ = Σ×∆n, depending on a specific
application context. Let Λuc ⊆ Λ and Λo ⊆ Λ be an uncontrollable alphabet and an observable
alphabet respectively, where if Λ = Σ × ∆n then Λo := Σo × ∆n. Let Pˆo : Λ∗ → Λ∗o be the
natural projection. In case that Λ = Σ × ∆n, we have Pˆo() = , Pˆo(σ, u) = (σ, u) if σ ∈ Σo,
or  otherwise, and Pˆo(µ(σ, u)) = Pˆo(µ)Pˆo(σ, u). When we mention a finite-state transitional
structure G, we mean that G is either a finite-state automaton or a finite-state transducer.
Definition 1: Given a finite-state transitional structure G, a sublanguage K ⊆ Lm(G) is
controllable w.r.t. G and Λuc, if KΛuc ∩ L(G) ⊆ K. 
Definition 2: Given a finite-state transitional structure G, a sublanguage K ⊆ Lm(G) is normal
w.r.t. G and Λo, if Pˆ−1o (Pˆo(K)) ∩ L(G) = K. 
Given a finite-state transitional structure G, whose alphabet is Λ, and a requirement E ⊆ Λ∗,
let
CN (G, E) := {K ⊆ Lm(G)∩E|K is controllable w.r.t. G and Λuc ∧K is normal w.r.t. G and Λo}.
By an argument similar to the one used in [4], we can derive that the supremal controllable and
normal sublanguage of Lm(G) exists, denoted as supCN (G, E), such that for all K ∈ CN (G, E),
we have K ⊆ supCN (G, E) ∈ CN (G, E).
In our setup, an attack is able to arbitrarily alter an observable event. Thus, each event
(σ, u) ∈ Σ ×∆n is considered controllable, as the attack can choose not to use this alteration.
Under this consideration, the uncontrollable alphabet Λuc is actually empty. Thus, in the following
attack model synthesis, we do not explicitly require controllability. This may sound a bit unusual
because we do have an uncontrollable alphabet Σuc for the plant G - how those uncontrollable
events affect the attack model synthesis? If we carefully check the properties of an ABSRA, we
can see that Property (4) actually implicitly enforces controllability with respect to Σuc because
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it requires the attack not to change the event enablement of the supervisor S at the current state,
and since by default the supervisor S ensures controllability with respect to Σuc, and so does
the attack model.
Assume that there exists Σo,p ⊆ Σo, which denotes a set of protected observable events that
cannot be altered by an ABSRA, i.e., given an attack model A = (Y,Σ,∆n, η, θ, y0, Ym), for all
y ∈ Y , (σ, u) ∈ Σo,p ×∆n, we have that η(y, σ, u)!⇒ u = σ. We now undertake the following
ABSRA synthesis procedure.
Procedure 1: (ABSRA Synthesis )
1) Input: a plant G = (X,Σ, ξ, x0, Xm), a supervisor S = (Z,Σ, δ, z0, Z) and Σo,p.
2) Construct a single-state transducer A0 = (Y,Σ,∆n, η, θ, y0, Y ), where Y = {y0} and the
transition map η encodes transitions labeled by a subset of (Σo \Σo,p)×∆n∪Σu,p×Σu,p∪
Σuo × {}, denoting all observable event alterations that the attack wants to consider.
3) Let E0 := {µ ∈ Lm(G× (A0 ◦ S))|ξ(x0, ψ(µ)) ∈ Xb,m} be a requirement.
4) Undertake the following iteration on k = 1, · · ·
a) Compute Kk := supCN (G× (A0 ◦ S), Ek−1).
b) Check property (4) in the definition of ABSRA. If it holds, then go to Step 5).
Otherwise, set Ek := {µ ∈ Kk|ψ(EnG×(A0◦S)(κ(x0, y0, z0, µ))) = EnS(δ(z0, θ(µ)))}
and continue the iteration on k.
5) Output: A∗, which recognizes Kk+1. 
Lemma 1: Procedure 1 terminates finitely. 
Proof: Assume that E0 is recognized by a transducer R0, whose state set is W0. Then K1 is
recognizable by a transducer, say R1, whose state set is a subset of X × Y × Z ×W0. It is not
difficult to check that for all µ, µ′ ∈ K1, if they hit the same state in R1, then we know that
ψ(EnG×(A0◦S)(κ(x0, y0, z0, µ))) = EnS(δ(z0, θ(µ)))
if and only if
ψ(EnG×(A0◦S)(κ(x0, y0, z0, µ
′))) = EnS(δ(z0, θ(µ′))).
In other words, µ ∈ E1 if and only if µ′ ∈ E1. Thus, for each state in R1, either all strings hitting
that state are in E1 or none of them are in E1, namely E1 is recognized by a sub-transducer Rˆ1
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of R1. Suppose the state set of Rˆ1 is W1 ⊆ X × Y × Z ×W0. By the property of automaton
composition, we know that there exists a transducer R2 recognizing K2 such that the state set
of R2 is a subset of X × Y × Z ×W1. Since W1 ⊆ X × Y × Z ×W0, we know that R2 is
DES-isomorphic to a sub-transducer of R1. By using the same argument, we can check that
each Kk is recognized by a transducer, which is DES-isomorphic to a sub-transducer of R1. In
addition, the state sets of those sub-transducers form a monotonic non-increasing sequence with
respect to set inclusion. Thus, in a finite number of iterations, a fixed sub-transducer will be
reached, whose language is Kk. This means Procedure 1 must terminate finitely. 
Lemma 2: Let Kk and A∗ be computed in Procedure 1. Then Kk := supCN (G × (A∗ ◦
S), Ek−1) = Lm(G× (A∗ ◦ S)). 
Proof: By the proof of Lemma 1 we know that A∗ is DES-isomorphic to the prefix closure of
a sub-transducer of G × (A0 ◦ S) × R0. Then by the definitions of sequential composition and
transducer product, the lemma follows. 
Theorem 2: A∗ obtained in Procedure 1 is the supremal ABSRA of (G,S). 
Proof: (a) We first show that A∗ is an ABSRA, i.e., A∗ satisfies properties (1)-(4). It is clear that
when the algorithm terminates, property (4) must hold. So we only focus on properties (1)-(3).
By the definition of A∗ and Prop. 1, we know that
θ(L(A∗)) = θ(supCN (G× (A∗ ◦ S), Ek−1)) ⊆ L(S).
By Lemma 2, we have Kk = Lm(G × (A∗ ◦ S)). Since Kk ⊆ Ek−1 and ψ(Ek−1) ⊆ {s ∈
Lm(G)|ξ(x0, s) ∈ Xb,m}, by Prop. 1 we have
ψ(Kk) = ψ(Lm(A∗ ◦ S)) ∩ Lm(G) = ψ(L(A∗ ◦ S)) ∩ {s ∈ Lm(G)|ξ(x0, s) ∈ Xb,m}.
For the third property, by Lemma 2 we know that Kk := supCN (G× (A∗ ◦ S), Ek−1). Thus,
by the definition of normality and the nonblocking property associated with a sub-transducer of
G× (A0 ◦ S)×R0, which recognizes Kk, we have
P−1o (Po(ψ(L(G× (A∗ ◦ S))))) ∩ L(G) = ψ(L(G× (A∗ ◦ S))).
This concludes our proof that A∗ is an ABSRA.
(b) Next, we show that A∗ is the supremal ABSRA. Let Aˆ be an ABSRA of the system.
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Clearly, L(Aˆ) ⊆ L(A0). Due to the controllability of S and the assumption that Aˆ is an
ABSRA, i.e., it must satisfy property (4), it is easy to check that Lm(G × (Aˆ ◦ S)) is con-
trollable w.r.t. Lm(G × (A0 ◦ S)) and Σuc. Since Aˆ must satisfy Property (3), we know that
Lm(G × (Aˆ ◦ S)) must be normal w.r.t. Lm(G × (A0 ◦ S)) and Σo. In addition, Aˆ satisfies
property (4). Thus, we can easily detive that Lm(G × (Aˆ ◦ S)) ∈ CN (G × (A0 ◦ S), Ek−1),
namely, Lm(G × (Aˆ ◦ S)) ⊆ Kk = supCN (G × (A0 ◦ S), Ek−1). This means L(Aˆ) ⊆ L(A∗),
which concludes the proof of the theorem. 
As an illustration, we apply Procedure 1 to the plant G shown in Figure 3 and the supervisor
S shown in Figure 4. We can see that the sensor attack model A in Figure 5 is actually A0 in
Procedure 1 because all events in the model are observable. The composition A0 ◦ S = A ◦ S
is shown in Figure 5. The outcome of G× (A0 ◦ S) is shown in Figure 6, which is isomorphic
to G. This is not surprising because any string in L(G) may be potentially extended to the bad
marker state. The requirement E is simply the same as G× (A0 ◦S). Clearly, we know that Kk
is recognizable by a transducer shown in Figure 7, which is almost the same as G× (A0 ◦ S),
except that the only marker state is that bad marker state due to the requirement E . Since all
Fig. 7. A transducer recognizing K∗
events are observable, from Pˆo(L(A∗)) = Pˆo(K∗) we can derive that L(A∗) = K∗. Thus, A∗
can be chosen by marking every state in G× (A0 ◦ S), i.e., A∗ = Prefix(G× (A0 ◦ S)), which
means A∗ is actually a canonical attack of A0 with respect to (G,S). By Theorem 2 we know
that A∗ is the supremal ABSRA of (G,S).
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IV. SYNTHESIS OF AN ABSRA-ROBUST SUPERVISOR
In the previous section we discuss how to design an ABSRA model to interrupt a given
system’s operations from an attacker’s point of view. In this section we present a synthesis
approach to design a supervisor, which is “robust” to any ABSRA in the sense that either the
attack is not covert or incurs no damage to the system.
Recall that an ABSRA affects a target system (G,S) by altering the sequence of observable
events, which tricks S to issue commands improperly. By protecting observable events from
being altered unnoticeably can in principle effectively deter an ABSRA. An observable event
in this framework denotes a specific set of strongly associated measurements. For example, in
the aforementioned single-tank system, the event h=H may either be associated with one simple
water level measurement or possibly several sensor measurements such as the actual water level,
and the corresponding pressure on the bottom of the tank - the more sensor measurements
associated with the event, the harder for an attack to alter the event without being detected.
When applying suitable encryption techniques, it is even more complicated for an attack to
complete the job. Thus, it is indeed technically feasible to prevent observable events from being
altered by either adopting new secure information transmission technologies or introducing more
sensors to significantly increase the complication of altering the corresponding observable event
without being detected. Nevertheless, there is always a financial consideration. An attractive
solution to a potential industrial user is to identify only critical observable events, which, when
being protected from external alterations, will lead to a supervisor robust to any ABSRA.
Problem 2: Given a plant G, a requirement E, and a protected observable alphabet Σo,p ⊆ Σo,
synthesize a supervisor S such that there is no ARSRA of the closed-loop system (G,S). 
With the same notations used in the previous section, let CN (G,E) be the collection of
all controllable and normal supervisors [10]. Let S0 = supCN (G,E), which always exists and
computable, as long as E ⊆ Σ∗ is regular. Our goal is to design a supervisor S ∈ CN (G,E) such
that Procedure 1 returns an ampty ABSRA A∗ with respect to the given protected observable
alphabet Σo,p. To this end, we present the following synthesis procedure:
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Procedure 2: (ABSRA-Robust Supervisor Synthesis)
1) Input: a plant G, a requirement E and a protected observable alphabet Σo,p.
2) Compute Kˆ = supCN (G,E). If Kˆ = ∅, terminate. Otherwise, assume Kˆ is recognized
by a finite-state automaton Sˆ, and continue.
3) Compute A∗ by using Procedure 1, i.e., computer Kk = supCN (G× (A0 ◦ Sˆ), Ek).
4) Compute K := supCN (G,L(Sˆ)− θ(Kk)).
5) Output: a recognizer S of K. 
Theorem 3: Given a plant G, a requirement E ⊆ Σ∗, and a protected observable alphabet
Σo,p, let S be computed above. If Lm(S) 6= ∅, then we have supCN (G × (A0 ◦ S), Ek) = ∅,
where Ek is defined in Procedure 1, i.e., there is no ABSRA A of (G,S). 
Proof: Assume that it is not true. Then there exists an ABSRA A such that L(A) = K˜k, where
K˜k = supCN (G× (A0 ◦S), Ek) 6= ∅. Since S is controllable and normal with respect to G, and
L(S) ⊆ L(Sˆ), we can get that K˜ ∈ CN (G×(A0◦Sˆ), Ek). Since Kk = supCN (G×(A0◦Sˆ), Ek),
we know that K˜ ⊆ Kk. But on the other hand, we know that θ(K˜) ⊆ K ⊆ L(S)− θ(Kk), i.e.,
K˜ * Kk, which leads to a contradiction. Thus, the ABSRA A does not exist. 
We would like to emphasize here again that, although Theorem 3 indicates that there is no
ABSRA A for the closed-loop system (G, Sˆ), it does not mean that a sensor reading alteration
attack will not be carried out by an attacker. But such an attack will either reveal itself to the
supervisor before it achieves its attack goal due to abnormal system executions (so that proper
contingent actions such as system shutdown can be taken by the supervisor, which is outside
the scope of this paper) or will not be able to lead the system to a bad state.
In Theorem 3, if K = ∅, then with the given protected observable alphabet Σo,p, there does
not exist a supervisor S that is ABSRA-robust. We face the following synthesis problem.
Problem 3: Given a plant G and a requirement E, compute a protected observable alphabet
Σo,p ⊆ Σo of the minimum size, which allows a nonempty ABSRA-robust supervisor S to exist.
It is clear that Problem 3 is solvable in the sense that it is decidable whether there exists
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such a Σo,p with the minimum size because we can simply enumerate each subset Σo,p ⊆ Σo,
and apply Procedure 2 on Σo,p to compute the corresponding supervisor S. Since there is a
finite number of such subsets, this brutal-force method will terminate, and provide a protected
observable alphabet of the minimum size together with the corresponding supervisor, if it exists.
The computational complexity of this procedure is certainly high, which is exponential to |Σo|,
but polynomial to the sizes of G and E due to our adoption of normality to handle observability.
If the size of Σo is big, to find a computationally viable algorithm that can solve Problem 3
becomes important, which will be addressed in our future works.
We now use that simple single-tank system to illustrate how to use Procedure 2 to compute
an ABSRA-robust supervisor, and how to determine a minimum protected observable alphabet,
which allows the existence of an ABSRA-robust supervisor. Let Σo,p = {h=H}. The model of
A0 and Sˆ are shown in Figure 8. When we run Procedure 1, we first compute G× (A0 ◦ Sˆ). The
Fig. 8. Models of A0 and Sˆ
outcome is depicted in Figure 9. We can see that G×(A0◦Sˆ) contains no bad marker state in Xb,m.
Thus, in Procedure 1 we have E0 = ∅, which returns K1 = supCN (Lm(G× (A0 ◦ Sˆ)), E0) = ∅.
After that, in Step 4) of Procedure 2, we have that K = supCN (Lm(G), Lm(Sˆ)) = Lm(Sˆ).
Thus, Sˆ is an ABSRA-robust supervisor for G with respect to the given Σo,p. Clearly, it is a
solution to Problem 3 because we cannot find any other protected observable alphabet with a
size smaller than 1, which can render an ABSRA-robust supervisor.
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Fig. 9. Models of A0 ◦ Sˆ (Right) and G× (A0 ◦ Sˆ) (Left)
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have first introduced the concept of ABSRA, upon which we have shown that
the supremal ABSRA exists and computable, as long as the plant model G and the supervisor
S are finitely representable, i.e., their languages are regular. After that, we have brought in the
problem of synthesizing an ABSRA-robust supervisor, and shows that it is possible to find a
minimum protected observable sub-alphabet, which may render an ABSRA-robust supervisor.
It is interesting to point out that, if we replace the third property of an ABSRA model with a
weaker observability property, e.g., the standard observability [2], the supremal ABSRA may not
exist any more. Nevertheless, the existence of an ABSRA is still decidable and computable (with
possibly a higher computational complexity), as this ABSRA synthesis problem is equivalent to
a synthesis problem of centralized supervisory control under partial observation, which has been
shown solvable [9]. Fortunately, the normality property can be easily satisfied in reality, as it
only requires that only observable and controllable events can be disabled in online applications
- in real industrial applications, it is typical that all control commands are observable. For this
reason, the supervisor synthesis approach proposed in this paper aiming to defy ABSRA is
practically feasible.
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